The Ethics Committee at Memorial Sloan Kettering Cancer Center (MSK) developed a Bioethics Ambassador Program (BAP); a yearlong educational program to assist clinical and non-clinical staff develop the skills to identify and address common burgeoning ethical issues that can arise during the provision of care to patients with cancer. The goal was to provide greater awareness of the role and services of Ethics, particularly at the institution’s geographically-diverse outpatient care centers and to better-instill a culture of preventative ethics. This article (...) discusses the design and implementation of the first two years of the program and analyzes its strengths, weaknesses, and impact on MSK. (shrink)

What are the driving forces of cultural macroevolution, the evolution of cultural traits that characterize societies or populations? This question has engaged anthropologists for more than a century, with little consensus regarding the answer. We develop and fit autologistic models, built upon both spatial and linguistic neighbor graphs, for 44 cultural traits of 172 societies in the Western North American Indian (WNAI) database. For each trait, we compare models including or excluding one or both neighbor graphs, and for the majority (...) of traits we find strong evidence in favor of a model which uses both spatial and linguistic neighbors to predict a trait’s distribution. Our results run counter to the assertion that cultural trait distributions can be explained largely by the transmission of traits from parent to daughter populations and are thus best analyzed with phylogenies. In contrast, we show that vertical and horizontal transmission pathways can be incorporated in a single model, that both transmission modes may indeed operate on the same trait, and that for most traits in the WNAI database, accounting for only one mode of transmission would result in a loss of information. (shrink)

We introduce a new and time-efficient memory-encoding paradigm for functional magnetic resonance imaging. This paradigm is optimized for mapping multiple contrasts using a mixed design, using auditory and visual stimuli. We demonstrate that the paradigm evokes robust neuronal activity in typical sensory and memory networks. We were able to detect auditory and visual sensory-specific encoding activities in auditory and visual cortices. Also, we detected stimulus-selective activation in environmental-, voice-, scene-, and face-selective brain regions. A subsequent recognition task allowed the detection (...) of sensory-specific encoding success activity in both auditory and visual cortices, as well as sensory-unspecific positive ESA in the hippocampus. Further, sensory-unspecific negative ESA was observed in the precuneus. Among others, the parallel mixed design enabled sustained and transient activity comparison in contrast to rest blocks. Sustained and transient activations showed great overlap in most sensory brain regions, whereas several regions, typically associated with the default-mode network, showed transient rather than sustained deactivation. We also show that the use of a parallel mixed model had relatively little influence on positive or negative ESA. Together, these results demonstrate a feasible, versatile, and brief memory-encoding task, which includes multiple sensory stimuli to guarantee a comprehensive measurement. This task is especially suitable for large-scale clinical or population studies, which aim to test task-evoked sensory-specific and sensory-unspecific memory-encoding performance as well as broad sensory activity across the life span within a very limited time frame. (shrink)

Dans cet ouvrage, Monique Lauret retrace l'histoire du mouvement psychanalytique en Chine qui ne cesse de croître depuis les années 1980, analyse l'influence de la pensée chinoise sur la théorisation de Lacan, et établit des passerelles entre pensée chinoise et psychanalyse. Il existe un passage inattendu entre pensée chinoise et psychanalyse autour de la question de l'humanisation et du rêve. Lacan s'intéressa en particulier à trois notions de la philosophie chinoise: la nature, le désir et la sagesse (discernement). Il (...) reprit les concepts clés de Mencius, fils spirituel de Confucius: le Xing (nature ou sexuel) et le Ming (décret du Ciel ou destin) à partir desquels il conçut la nature de l'être parlant soumis aux lois du Ciel, c'est-à-dire celles de son désir et de sa jouissance. Il porta aussi un regard neuf sur la langue et l'écriture idéographique chinoises: il y découvrit un système de signifiance révélant le mécanisme subtil de l'inconscient structuré comme écriture, ce qui lui permit d'approfondir les concepts de jouissance, d'identification et de Trait unaire. Enfin, il dénonça l'effondrement de la ' sagesse ' de l'humanité à l'origine de nos maux contemporains: une précipitation dans la haine et l'archaïque, la haine étant le plus puissant vecteur de la pulsion de mort. Par ce dialogue entre deux pensées civilisationnelles qui défendent l'idée que l'homme ne peut être humain que dans sa relation à l'autre, cet ouvrage propose une position de discernement face à l'essor de la révolution techno-numérique et au malaise dans la civilisation. (shrink)

Dans la Genèse, l’exil abrahamique, paradigme d’un mouvement qui constitue le premier pas de la réalisation de l’homme, est caractérisé par une séparation et une mise en route. C’est le début du temps historique. L’Exode fait le récit d’un exil collectif sous la houlette de Moïse : la sortie d’Égypte, le séjour dans le désert, avant d’atteindre la Terre promise. Ce séjour dans le désert est le temps d’initiation des Hébreux à la vie sociale. D’un assemblage de tribus, les Hébreux (...) deviennent un peuple, avec des lois et une justice, métaphore de la transformation potentielle par l’analyse. (shrink)

One in three university students experiences mental health problems during their study. A similar percentage leaves higher education without obtaining the degree for which they enrolled. Research suggests that both mental health problems and academic underperformance could be caused by students lacking control and purpose while they are adjusting to tertiary education. Currently, universities are not designed to cater to all the personal needs and mental health problems of large numbers of students at the start of their studies. Within the (...) literature aimed at preventing mental health problems among students (e.g., anxiety or depression), digital forms of therapy recently have been suggested as potentially scalable solutions to address these problems. Integrative psychological artificial intelligence (AI) in the form of a chatbot, for example, shows great potential as an evidence-based solution. At the same time, within the literature aimed at improving academic success, the online life-crafting intervention in which students write about values and passions, goals, and goal-attainment plans has shown to improve the academic performance and retention rates of students. Because the life-crafting intervention is delivered through the curriculum and doesn’t bear the stigma that is associated with therapy, it can reach larger populations of students. But life-crafting lacks the means for follow-up or the interactiveness that online AI-guided therapy can offer. In this paper, we propose to integrate the current literature on chatbot interventions aimed at the mental health of students with research about a life-crafting intervention that uses an inclusive curriculum-wide approach. When a chatbot asks students to prioritize both academic as well as social and health-related goals and provides personalized follow-up coaching, this can prevent -often interrelated- academic and mental health problems. Right on-time delivery, and personalized follow-up questions enhance the effects of both -originally separated- intervention types. Research on this new combination of interventions should use design principles that increase user-friendliness and monitor the technology acceptance of its participants. (shrink)

Le verbe croire renvoie à des réalités diverses et contradictoires. Croire c'est à la fois être certain, tenir pour vrai, adhérer avec conviction, mais c'est aussi, penser, admettre comme probable, envisager comme possible, et donc ouvrir la voie au doute, à l'opinion, au débat. Le verbe croire possède de multiples usages. Songeons que l'on croit en Dieu alors que l'on croit au diable. On croit à, on croit en, on croit que. Les historiens mobilisés dans cet ouvrage s'interrogent sur ces (...) modalités complexes de la croyance dans tous les domaines du champ social. Privilégier les temps de ruptures, de déconstruction des croyances, les seuils épistémologiques fut le fil conducteur de cette recherche entre "croire" et "ne pas croire". (shrink)

The Search for the Legacy of the USPHS Syphilis Study at Tuskegee is a collection of essays from experts in a variety of fields seeking to redefine the legacy of the infamous Tuskegee Syphilis Study. The essayists place the legacy of the study within the evolution of racial and ethnic relations in the United States. Contributors include two leading historians on the study, two former United States Surgeons General, and other prominent scholars from a wide range of fields.

The aim of this article is to offer a view of the current status of women in medical physics and biomedical engineering, while focusing on solutions towards gender balance and providing examples of current activities carried out at national and international levels. The International Union of Physical and Engineering Scientists in Medicine is committed to advancing women in science and health and has several initiatives overseen by the Women in Medical Physics and Biomedical Engineering Task Group. Some of the main (...) strategies proposed by the Task Group to attain gender balance are: (a) identify and promote female role models that achieve successful work-life balance, (b) establish programs to develop female leaders, (c) create opportunities for females to increase the international visibility within the scientific community, and (d) establish archives and databases of women in STEM. (shrink)

A new high‐resolution structure of a pain‐sensing ion channel, TRPA1, provides a molecular scaffold to understand channel function. Unexpected structural features include a TRP‐domain helix similar to TRPV1, a novel ligand‐binding site, and an unusual C‐terminal coiled coil stabilized by inositol hexakisphosphate (IP6). TRP‐domain helices, which structurally act as a nexus for communication between the channel gates and its other domains, may thus be a feature conserved across the entire TRP family and, possibly, other allosterically‐gated channels. Similarly, the TRPA1 antagonist‐binding (...) site could also represent a druggable location in other ion channels. Combined with known TRPA1 functional properties, the structural role for IP6 leads us to propose that polyphosphate unbinding could act as a molecular kill switch for TRPA1 inactivation. Finally, although packing of the TRPA1 membrane‐proximal region hints at a mechanism for electrophile sensing, the details of how TRPA1 responds to noxious reactive electrophiles and temperature await future studies.Also watch the Video Abstract. (shrink)

Rien n'est plus précieux dans notre littérature "que la lucidité implacable de ce regard, plus que la sincérité courageuse de cette voix qui ne s'est rien caché par timidité et qui n'a rien dissimulé par prudence des tares de la société", écrivait Marcel Jouhandeau préfaçant Les Caractères ou les Moeurs de ce siècle de La Bruyère. Cette appréciation est tout à fait transposable au livre de Monique Charles qui, pour ce qui est du style, serait quelque chose ou quelqu'un (...) entre La Bruyère et Céline, donc littérairement inclassable (Freud et Lacan sont passés par là!), mais terriblement efficace. C'est vivant, buissonnier, digresseur (mais on ne regrette pas les détours imprévus qui, changeant le décor, font rebondir la réflexion). De l'expérience, de la faconde, du souffle. Des réflexions intéressantes sur le deuil, l'amour, les rapports entre les sexes, le couple, le mariage, le problème du Mal, la douleur, le désir, les passions, la psychologie du Tueur... Et pour clore ce parcours du combattant à cloche-pied sur tant de faits, d'idées, de drames, arrêtons-nous à celui-ci : Non la femme n'est pas celle qui tire l'homme vers le bas, "l'éteignoir de l'homme". Monique Charles les réveillerait plutôt! Elle a enseigné avec passion. Maintenant il faut la lire. (shrink)

Résumé Je n’étais jamais allée en banlieue et je n’avais jamais eu de contact avec une population ouvrière auparavant. J’étais dans une position de découverte complète, sociale et imaginaire. J’avais vingt-cinq ans et les femmes que j’interviewais avaient trente-cinq à quarante ans. C’était un type de rapport social que je n’avais jamais connu. Au tournant des années 1960-1970, il y avait un immense désir de l’ailleurs et l’autre était survalorisé.

En 378 ap. J.-C., alors que les Romains s'accommodent bien de leur cohabitation avec les populations barbares d'Europe occidentale, y puisant la main-d'oeuvre de leur agriculture et de leur armée, les Goths viennent tout d'un coup, sans doute pour échapper aux Huns, s'amasser trop nombreux sur les rives du Danube. Débordés par la multitude des demandeurs d'asile, les Romains hésitent à entrouvrir leur frontière, et les Barbares, exaspérés, finissent par entrer en force. La situation dégénère, amorçant le phénomène qui mènera (...) à la chute de l'Empire romain. Mais ces événements aboutiront aussi à la création de l'Europe telle que nous la connaissons.In 378 BC, when the Romans will do well to cohabit with the barbarian peoples of Western Europe, including drawing on the labor of their agriculture and their armies, the Goths come suddenly probably to escape the Huns, too many gather on the banks of the Danube. Overwhelmed by the multitude of asylum seekers, the Romans are reluctant to loosen their border, and the Barbarians, exasperated, finally come into force. The situation escalates, initiating the phenomenon leading to the fall of the Roman Empire. But these events lead to the creation of Europe as we know it. (shrink)

English summary: The author posits that Nietzsche developed thinking that embraced antinomical associations, a thinking that does not add up opposites, nor eliminates one or the other, but surpasses them. French text.French description: "On sait ce que j'exige du philosophe : de se placer par-delà le bien et le mal, - de placer au-dessous de lui l'illusion du jugement moral." Se situer par-delà bien et mal, ce n'est pas adopter une posture immorale ou amorale, c'est comprendre qu'au principe de toute (...) antinomie se trouve une croyance à des valeurs dont la valeur éternelle et sacrée est garantie par son opposition à des contraires tenus pour être absolument mauvais. Le but de ce livre est de montrer comment Nietzsche s'y prend pour refuser l'alternative "morale" du pour et du contre et guérir la pensée de ces oppositions populaires "sur lesquelles les métaphysiciens ont apposé leur sceau", par exemple historique / éternel, expliquer / interpréter, être /devenir, réalité /apparence, volonté de vie /volonté de vérité. Dans la mesure où les falsifications et les mensonges dont ces couples procèdent sont des mensonges utiles et des falsifications nécessaires et non pas des erreurs, il ne suffit pas d'en prendre conscience pour les rectifier, il faut inventer les moyens d'en sortir, multiplier les perspectives et penser dynamiquement en termes de forces, de devenirs, d'advenirs. Dépasser ou surmonter, laisser derrière soi ou au-dessous de soi : il n'y a pas qu'une seule façon de se situer "par-delà". Mais chacune est l'exploration d'un dangereux peut-être. (shrink)

La question du Philèbe, ce dialogue mal aimé des platonisants, est finalement la plus simple et la plus énigmatique de toutes : celle du rapport entre la vie et la pensée. La vie a l'illusion de se suffire quand elle se fait plaisir, mais cette illusion, c'est la pensée qui la dénonce et non la vie ; la pensée est certaine de se suffire quand elle pense, mais elle ne se suffit que parce qu'il y a un plaisir de pensée, (...) et la vie reprend son bien. Si la question est là, il n'y a pas à la résoudre : dans le mélange nous sommes. Mais comment le composer? Il faut alors différencier les plaisirs, les hiérarchiser, en rejeter certains et en retenir d'autres. Mais il reste que le plaisir est, de la vie, une profondeur, un éclat, que la pensée est impuissante à récupérer. L'illimitation de la vie, quand la vie fait miroiter cette promesse infinie de délices, se moque de toute dialectique. Elle est ce que la pensée ne peut que laisser échapper, en le sachant. Ce que la pensée laisse ainsi filer n'a rien de consistant, ni même d'existant, mais c'est cela aussi vivre : être séduit par le mirage de la vie. Que le mirage soit décevant ne suffit pas à le réfuter. Le plaisir est le bien tel que le désire la vie : qu'arrive-t-il à la pensée quand elle s'y confronte? Elle n'a pas le beau rôle. Elle peut au moins tenter de ne pas être morose, ou morale, de ne pas « chagriner le plaisir ». Mais elle ne peut pas parler au nom de sa vérité propre : elle ne peut que revendiquer le fait d'être au principe d'une meilleure vie. Et montrer que prendre parti pour l'illimité de la vie, c'est prendre parti pour son contraire, qui n'est même pas une mort mais une défaite et une décomposition : telle est la fêlure du plaisir. (shrink)

On trouvera dans ce Lectures de Platon une diversité d'interprétations liées à différents choix méthodologiques. Des lectures "analytiques" voisinent avec des lectures "contemplatives" et quasi mystiques, des partisans d'un système caché de doctrines non écrites côtoient des philologues qui tiennent pour préalables indispensables les décisions quant à la chronologie des oeuvres écrites, mais un trait commun se dégage avec évidence, à savoir que lire Platon, c'est être sensible aux risques pris, à la diversité des chemins frayés, aux "digressions" qui se (...) révèlent être les seules voies possibles, aux différences de vitesse d'une pensée déroutante que ne décourage ni petit ni grand problème, et qui reconnaît dans sa liberté la condition de sa rencontre avec la vérité. La nature du texte de Platon possède cette singulière puissance : forcer chacun, quand il s'efforce de l'interpréter, à dévoiler la manière dont il se représente ce que c'est que penser, et, au-delà, à révéler ce qu'il attend de la philosophie. (shrink)

The Huguenot refugee artist Jacques Le Moyne de Morgues is traditionally known for his observations of North America and as the author of numerous albums of floral drawings. This article reassesses the attribution of several of these albums to Le Moyne based on documentary and stylistic evidence. It identifies the sixteenth-century Huguenot nobleman and diplomat Jacques de Morogues as the owner of one of the albums, and it discusses the production and early use of these albums as luxury gifts in (...) French diplomatic and courtly circles. We document connections between the albums associated with Le Moyne and other sixteenth-century and later works of floral imagery. We argue that the albums associated with Le Moyne show that developments in floral imagery in this period were driven by a distinct network of artists and collectors, and we offer a hypothesis of how members of this network may have interpreted them as an occasion to take pleasure in nature’s charming variety, to praise it as God’s work and to use flowers as symbols of feminine beauty and fertility. (shrink)

Black Art and Aesthetics comprises essays, poems, interviews, and over 50 images from artists and writers: GerShun Avilez, Angela Y. Davis, Thomas F. DeFrantz, Theaster Gates, Aracelis Girmay, Jeremy Matthew Glick, Deborah Goffe, James B. Haile III, Vijay Iyer, Isaac Julien, Benjamin Krusling, Daphne Lamothe, George E. Lewis, Sarah Elizabeth Lewis, Meleko Mokgosi, Wangechi Mutu, Fumi Okiji, Nell Painter, Mickaella Perina, Kevin Quashie, Claudia Rankine, Claudia Schmuckli, Evie Shockley, Paul C. Taylor, Kara Walker, Simone White, and Mabel O. Wilson. The (...) stellar contributors practice Black aesthetics by engaging intersectionally with class, queer sexuality, female embodiment, dance vocabularies, coloniality, Afrodiasporic music, Black post-soul art, Afropessimism, and more. Black aesthetics thus restores aesthetics to its full potential by encompassing all forms of sensation and imagination in art, culture, design, everyday life, and nature and by creating new ways of reckoning with experience, identity, and resistance. Highlighting wide-ranging forms of Black aesthetics across the arts, culture, and theory, Black Art and Aesthetics: Relationalities, Interiorities, Reckonings provides an unprecedented view of a field enjoying a global resurgence. Black aesthetics materializes in communities of artists, activists, theorists, and others who critique racial inequities, create new forms of interiority and relationality, uncover affective histories, and develop strategies for social justice. (shrink)

Beaucoup croient que le combat en faveur des libertés est achevé. C'est là une dramatique illusion. Notre monde est de plus en plus opaque et complexe. Nos libertés d'agir sont menacées. Défendre les idées libérales est aujourd'hui une exigence pour tous les mouvements politiques soucieux de favoriser l'autonomie et l'émancipation humaines. Les thèses défendues dans ce livre peuvent s'énoncer simplement. Contrairement aux idées reçues : le libéralisme ne se réduit pas au libéralisme économique ; la pensée libérale est encore une (...) source d'inspiration politique ; les idées libérales peuvent recevoir une interprétation sociale ; une part de l'histoire du socialisme est marquée par la persistance d'une orientation libérale ; libéralisme et socialisme peuvent être conciliés. Si le socialisme ne peut prendre en charge la cause des libertés, il faudra en conclure que son rôle émancipateur est définitivement révolu. L'orientation libérale au sein du socialisme n'est pas une nécessité malheureuse, une compromission, encore moins le sacrifice de la pureté socialiste sur l'autel des contraintes économiques. Cette orientation doit bien plutôt être assumée, revendiquée, car elle correspond à une interprétation du socialisme manifeste dès son origine. Elle incarne aujourd'hui l'avenir du socialisme. (shrink)

Depuis une vingtaine d’années, les statistiques dites « ethniques » font l’objet en France d’un débat récurrent. Si elles aident à faire apparaître des contradictions et des inégalités centrales dans la société, elles sont une arme à double tranchant dans la mesure où elles entraînent également un effet de stigmatisation par l’assignation à une appartenance supposée communautaire non nécessairement revendiquée subjectivement. C’est peut-être en observant ce que se fait et se dit hors de France qu’on pourra mieux mesurer les effets (...) comparés de ce dispositif profondément ambivalent. (shrink)

Le Dictionnaire d'économie politique et diplomatique paraît entre 1784 et 1788 sous la direction de J. N. Démeunier (1751-1814), homme politique français et publiciste. Sur la base d'une définition qui inscrit les questions économiques nouvelles dans le champ de la réflexion sociale et politique classique, le Dictionnaire présente une conception globalisante de l'économique relativement innovante. Dans le cadre du présent volume III (Économie politique) des Anthologies de l'encyclopédie méthodique, nous avons privilégié l'ensemble des articles consacrés aux États-Unis et à la (...) Virginie, ce nouveau Monde où « la réflexion politique moderne est mise à l'épreuve, et transformée par l'économie politique ». Le modèle américain est tendu par Démeunier à « la partie la plus saine de l'Europe » comme « le miroir de son avenir », en particulier quand il célèbre la dimension exemplaire du nouveau code civil et criminel préparé pour la Virginie, ou encore les dispositions sur la tolérance religieuse. Enfin, nous avons fait suivre le choix d'articles tirés du Dictionnaire de Démeunier d'extraits de la traduction française de l'abbé Morellet des Observations sur la Virginie, ouvrage rédigé par Jefferson et auquel Démeunier a abondamment emprunté. Le lecteur appréciera derechef la hauteur et la nouveauté de vues de ce grand homme, héritier exemplaire des Lumières, préoccupé tout entier de réformes et de changements pour cette nouvelle société en train de se constituer. Cette anthologie paraît de façon posthume. C'est en effet le dernier ouvrage que préparait Paule-Monique VERNES, professeure émérite de philosophie moderne et politique à l'Université de Provence, quand elle est décédée soudainement le 15 janvier 2013. J. Boulad-Ayoub s'est occupée de compléter, avec l'aide de Christian Jobin, la présente publication laissée inachevée par la disparition de son éditrice. (shrink)

L’» héroïsme » est une notion complexe, dont le sens a évolué dans le temps. Littré le définit comme « ce qui est propre au héros », ce qui nous renvoie à l’article « Héros » plus fourni. L’acception qui peut en être retenue ici semble être la troisième : « Tout homme [sic : preuve que le présent ouvrage est utile] qui se distingue par la force du caractère, la grandeur d’âme, une haute vertu …». Notons que c’est une (...) notion relativement récente. Le Dictionnaire de Furetière l’ignore en 1690 e... (shrink)

Le présent article vise à montrer qu'on ne peut ranger Aristote parmi les « intellectualistes tempérés » que si l'on privilégie la représentation de l'objet désirable par rapport à la faculté motrice elle-même, qui est bien la faculté désirante et elle seule. Si la phantasia semble être finalement la seule faculté cognitive dont on ne saurait se passer pour se mouvoir et agir, c'est parce qu'elle régit la forme de base du mode de présentation du désirable ou bien pratique, qui (...) est celle de l'apparaître. The present article is arguing that Aristotle can be ranked amongst the « moderate intellectualists » only if we put the stress on the representation of the desirable rather than on the faculty which produces movement, which is really the faculty of desire alone. If the phantasia seems to be ultimately the alone cognitive faculty which is needed for moving and acting, it is because it rules the most basic form of mode of presentation for the desirable or practical good, which is appearing. (shrink)

En ces temps où, dans la production éditoriale comme au cinéma, Marie-Antoinette est à la mode, il faut absolument s’arrêter sur cet ouvrage. Le titre exact de ce court pamphlet (30 p.), publié anonymement en août 1793 après le renvoi de Marie-Antoinette devant le Tribunal révolutionnaire, est Réflexions sur le procès de la reine par une femme. Et c’est aux femmes que l’auteure s’adresse en premier, aux « femmes de tous les pays, de toutes les classes de la société » (...) : sensibles, elles ne peu... (shrink)

C’est un beau livre sur la dialectique platonicienne que nous offre l’auteure. La lecture de cet ouvrage introduit progressivement le lecteur au coœur même de la pensée de Platon en lui faisant traverser les grands textes classiques des dialogues sur la dialectique: des dialogues socratiques au Philèbe, en passant par La République, le Phèdre, le Parménide, Le Sophiste et Le Politique. Une analyse minitieuse de ces textes aidera le lecteur à mieux comprendre pourquoi la dialectique de Platon ne peut être (...) réduite à une simple logique de la prédication, comme l’ont voulu les interprètes de Platon dans la tradition analytique contemporaine, à la méthode aristotélicienne de division de l’universel en genres et espèces, comme elle est souvent comprise dans la tradition continentale, non plus qu’à un système fondé sur une théorie des premiers principes, comme le croient les partisans de l’ésotérisme de l’école de Tübingen-Milan. Dixsaut reconstruit la dialectique platonicienne dans son essence même, non pas au niveau de la connaissance dianoétique propre à la logique et aux sciences mathématiques, mais comme un mouvement de la pensée noétique qui va de l’un au multiple et du multiple à l’un, non par dérivation mais par position d’unités, un mouvement qui s’effectue de diverses façons selon la thématique propre à chaque dialogue. D’où le titre Métamorphoses de la dialectique. (shrink)

Cette étude se place à la croisée de trois auteurs qui laissent entrevoir, à l'horizon du nucléaire, la persistance d'un même questionnement autour du concept inattendu de "déception". Le nucléaire, qui semble accompagné par une multiplication sans retour des discours sur la fin, emporte jusqu'à l'idée même de fondement, exposant la raison à l'effondrement de son "principe" et entraînant le "désappointement" du programme rationnel de la modernité. La raison semble alors incapable de se soustraire au règne du simulacre qui "instrumentalise (...) les idées mais ne les pense plus" (Levinas). Face à la recrudescence des discours catastrophistes, il s'agira alors de "démystifier l'apocalypse" et "l'alternative du tout ou rien qui transforme en un pouvoir quasi mystique l'arme de l'atome" (Blanchot). Derrida, Blanchot et Levinas, proposeront trois analyses qui semblent nous "dissuader" de penser le phénomène nucléaire selon le critère d'une vérité conventionnelle car il se présente sous les traits d'une "apocalypse sans apocalypse, sans révélation de sa propre vérité, sans savoir absolu" (Derrida). Trois apologies paradoxales qui élèvent le désastre nucléaire au rang de principe "d'époque", tout en suspendant ce geste dans l'insignifiance d'une absence de révélation et l'effondrement du sens, exposant la pensée à une "déception", un "dessaisissement", qui s'avèrent essentiels à son renouveau. Il semblait d'autant plus important, à l'heure de la post-vérité, d'analyser cette éthique de la déception qui reconduit la raison hégémonique à sa "fission" inhérente."--Page 4 of cover. (shrink)

C’est dans le cadre d’un cycle de manifestations organisées par l’Association « Rencontres médiévales européennes » présidée par Monique Cazaux, que s’est déroulé le colloque dont les actes sont ici présentés. Comme le dit cette dernière dans son introduction, l’objectif de la rencontre et donc du volume est de « revenir aux sources des religions chrétienne et musulmane et de reprendre les discussions théologiques et philosophiques qui ont eu lieu dès le Moyen Âge » puis de s’interroger sur l..

A partir la thèse avancée par Monique David-Ménard, selon laquelle l’entendement réussi là où la raison échoue, il s’agit d’examiner la révolution kantienne dans la manière de penser. Pour tirer les conséquences du renversement dans la pensée mis en oeuvre par la philosophie kantienne, l’auteur interroge la constitution de la réalité dans la perspective transcendantale comme double opération avec le non-savoir portant respectivement sur le sujet et le noumène. Sur le fond de cette interrogation, il montre que la réalité (...) à laquelle a affaire la philosophie kantienne n’est ni la réalité objective constituée, ni la réalité hallucinée du désir de la raison transgressant les limites de la connaissance, mais à une réalité subjectivée, constituée par la mise en scène de la double destitution : celle de la réalité phénoménale et celle de la raison. C’est sur ce point que peut s’établir une alliance militante entre la philosophie et la psychanalyse, alliance dont l’enjeu principal, pour l’une comme pour l’autre, consiste justement en ceci que chacune, pour son propre compte, pense la réalité comme une telle scène du Deux. (shrink)

Introduction, W G Runciman Social Evolution in Primates: The Role of Ecological Factors and Male Behaviour, Carel P van Schaik Determinants of Group Size in Primates: A General Model, R I M Dunbar Function and Intention in the Calls of Non-Human Primates, Dorothy L Cheney & Robert M Seyfarth Why Culture is Common, but Cultural Evolution is Rare, Robert Boyd & Peter J Richerson An Evolutionary and Chronological Framework for Human Social Behaviour, Robert A Foley Friendship and the Banker?s Paradox: (...) Other Pathways to the Evolution of Adaptations for Altruism, John Tooby & Leda Cosmides The Early Prehistory of Human Social Behaviour: Issues of Archaeological Inference and Cognitive Evolution, Steven Mithen The Emergence of Biologically Modern Populations in Europe: A Social and Cognitive ?Revolution??, Paul Mellars Responses to Environmental Novelty: Changes in Men?s Marriage Strategies in a Rural Kenyan Community, Monique Borgerhoff Mulder Genetic Language Impairment: Unruly Grammars, M Gopnik, J Dalalakis, S E Fukuda, S Fukuda & E Kehayia The Emergence of Cultures among Wild Chimpanzees, Christophe Boesch Terrestriality, Bipedalism and the Origin of Language, Leslie C Aiello Conclusions, John Maynard Smith. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:The Newly Veiled Woman: Irigaray, Specularity, and the Islamic VeilAnne-Emmanuelle Berger (bio)In 1995, in a piece published in a special issue of Les temps modernes devoted to the Algerian “Guerre des frères,” the late Monique Gadant, a sociologist of postcolonial Algeria, called for a dispassionate reflection on the reasons why a sizable number of Algerian women, in Algeria but also in France, decided to wear the hijab, or (...) “Islamic veil,” without, she said, being coerced into doing it. Warning against a naive French ethnocentrism which may have led people to mistake the hijab too quickly for a sign of women’s oppression, she wrote:C’est s’aveugler que de ne pas voir qu’il y a de très nombreuses femmes qui portent le hidjab sans y être forcées par personne.... Avant de se dresser contre le hidjab, réduit à un symbole d’oppression (les femmes qui le portent étant jugées en contradiction avec ce qui est censé être leurs intérêts et la vérité sur elles-mêmes dites par d’autres), on devrait prendre un peu de temps pour réfléchir aux motivations de ces femmes.[”Femmes alibi” 228][One would be blind not to see that numerous women are wearing the hijab without being forced to do it by anybody.... Before denouncing the hijab, reductively conceived as a symbol of oppression—the women wearing it being found to contradict what are supposed to be their interests and the truth about themselves as told by others—one should take some time to reflect on these women’s motivation.]Indeed, a growing number of women have adopted the hijab in the past decade, in Muslim or predominantly Muslim countries where the “Islamic veil” has not yet been made state law, as is the case in Iran. One thinks of Egypt or Indonesia, for instance, as two other examples where—against weak attempts by the governments in place to curb the powerful development of Islamism, after they helped foster it—the hijab has enjoyed considerable though unequal success. One should not underestimate coercion as a factor, especially within the last few years, when terrorism directed against civilians in Algeria and ever-growing intimidation stemming from Islamism’s social success in Egypt have undeniably led tens of thousands of scared, weary, or energetically “persuaded” women to wear the veil. Nonetheless, I want to take up Monique Gadant’s suggestion that we seriously try to think through at least some of the stakes of the phenomenon she identifies: an impressive number of women today affirm that they want to wear the hijab, and they do it. This raises at least two series of questions: (1) if the hijab fulfills a wish, rather than indicating a state of oppression or alienation, one has to reflect on the nature and structure of this wish or desire, and perhaps ask what the relation might be between desire and the veil, or rather this veil. For the hijab, as it is called in Arabic, is indeed a new kind of veil, or rather a new way of using an old Koranic precept, one intended to replace traditional modes of dressing and veiling. (2) If the hijab, and sometimes even the nikab and the jelbab, which cover women’s faces and bodies entirely, are willingly worn, should one [End Page 93] take this as a particularly blatant testimony to the radical relativity of cultures, which would in turn preclude any “Westerner” or non-Muslim individuals or groups, beginning with women, from making any assumptions concerning the condition of women or the hermeneutics of gender relations across cultures? This is indeed what Gadant hints at when she denounces the “naive [French] ethnocentrism” [228] at work in the negative response to the hijab. 1 One encounters here, as we know, a most divisive, philosophically crucial, and politically decisive issue, one that not only pitches non-Westerners against Westerners, but sometimes equally forcefully, as in this case, “Westerners” against “Westerners.” Ethnocentrism, as a tendency to (mis)understand a different culture in terms of one’s own, hence as a veiled form of cultural imperialism, should be uncovered and indeed denounced... (shrink)

This essay is an introduction to the cluster on Latina feminism published in Hypatia (Spring 2016), Vo. 31 (2), which features essays on various areas of Latina feminisms as well as discussions on the intersection of Latina feminisms and the work of thinkers such as Mikhail Bakhtin, Simone de Beauvoir, Enrique Dussell, Immanuel Kant, Édouard Glissant, Walter Mignolo, and Friedrich Nietzsche. Contributors to the cluster include Stephanie Rivera Berruz, Cynthia M. Paccacerqua, Andrea J. Pitts, Monique Roelofs, Susan C. Méndez, (...) Gabriela Veronelli, and Elena Flores Ruiz. (shrink)

Emphasizing the human body in all of its forms, Beauty Unlimited expands the boundaries of what is meant by beauty both geographically and aesthetically. Peg Zeglin Brand and an international group of contributors interrogate the body and the meaning of physical beauty in this multidisciplinary volume. This striking and provocative book explores the history of bodily beautification; the physicality of socially or culturally determined choices of beautification; the interplay of gender, race, class, age, sexuality, and ethnicity within and on the (...) body; and the aesthetic meaning of the concept of beauty in an increasingly globalized world. Foreward by Carolyn Korsmeyer. Authors include Noel Carroll, Gregory Velazco Y Trianosky, Monique Roelofs, Whitney Davis, Eleanor Heartney, Diana Tietjens Meyers, Phoebe M. Farris, Mary Devereaux, Jo Ellen Jacobs, Karina L. Cespedes-Cortes and Paul C. Taylor, Fedwa Malti-Douglas, Stephen Davies, Jane Duran, Valerie Sullivan Fuchs, Keith Lehrer, Allen Douglas, Cynthia Freeland, Eva Kit Wah Man, Mary Bittner Wiseman, and Peg Brand's essay, "ORLAN Revisited: Disembodied Virtual Hybrid Beauty.". (shrink)

continent. 1.1 : 3-13. / 0/ – Introduction I want to propose, as a trajectory into the philosophically weird, an absurd theoretical claim and pursue it, or perhaps more accurately, construct it as I point to it, collecting the ground work behind me like the Perpetual Train from China Mieville's Iron Council which puts down track as it moves reclaiming it along the way. The strange trajectory is the following: Kant's critical philosophy and much of continental philosophy which has followed, (...) has been a defense against horror and madness. Kant's prohibition on speculative metaphysics such as dogmatic metaphysics and transcendental realism, on thinking beyond the imposition of transcendental and moral constraints, has been challenged by numerous figures proceeding him. One of the more interesting critiques of Kant comes from the mad black Deleuzianism of Nick Land stating, “Kant’s critical philosophy is the most elaborate fit of panic in the history of the Earth.” And while Alain Badiou would certainly be opposed to the libidinal investments of Land's Deleuzo-Guattarian thought, he is likewise critical of Kant's normative thought-bureaucracies: Kant is the one author for whom I cannot feel any kinship. Everything in him exasperates me, above all his legalism—always asking Quid Juris? Or ‘Haven’t you crossed the limit?’—combined, as in today’s United States, with a religiosity that is all the more dismal in that it is both omnipresent and vague. The critical machinery he set up has enduringly poisoned philosophy, while giving great succour to the academy, which loves nothing more than to rap the knuckles of the overambitious [….] That is how I understand the truth of Monique David-Menard’s reflections on the properly psychotic origins of Kantianism. I am persuaded that the whole of the critical enterprise is set up to to shield against the tempting symptom represented by the seer Swedenborg, or against ‘diseases of the head’, as Kant puts it. An entire nexus of the limits of reason and philosophy are set up here, namely that the critical philosophy not only defends thought from madness, philosophy from madness, and philosophy from itself, but that philosophy following the advent of the critical enterprise philosophy becomes auto-vampiric; feeding on itself to support the academy. Following Francois Laruelle's non-philosophical indictment of philosophy, we could go one step further and say that philosophy operates on the material of what is philosophizable and not the material of the external world. [1] Beyond this, the Kantian scheme of nestling human thinking between our limited empirical powers and transcendental guarantees of categorical coherence, forms of thinking which stretch beyond either appear illegitimate, thereby liquefying both pre-critical metaphysics and the ravings of the mad in the same critical acid. In rejecting the Kantian apparatus we are left with two entities – an unsure relation of thought to reality where thought is susceptible to internal and external breakdown and a reality with an uncertain sense of stability. These two strands will be pursued, against the sane-seal of post-Kantian philosophy by engaging the work of weird fiction authors H.P. Lovecraft and Thomas Ligotti. The absolute inhumanism of the formers universe will be used to describe a Shoggothic Materialism while the dream worlds of the latter will articulate the mad speculation of a Ventriloquil Idealism. But first we must address the relation of philosophy to madness as well as philosophy to weird fiction. /1/ – Philosophy and Madness There is nothing that the madness of men invents which is not either nature made manifest or nature restored. Michel Foucault. Madness and Civilization. The moment I doubt whether an event that I recall actually took place, I bring the suspicion of madness upon myself: unless I am uncertain as to whether it was not a mere dream. Arthur Schopenhauer. The World as Will and Idea, Vol. 3. Madness is commonly thought of as moving through several well known cultural-historical shifts from madness as a demonic or otherwise theological force, to rationalization, to medicalization psychiatric and otherwise. Foucault's Madness and Civilization is well known for orientating madness as a form of exclusionary social control which operated by demarcating madness from reason. Yet Foucault points to the possibility of madness as the necessity of nature at least prior to the crushing weight of the church. Kant’s philosophy as a response to madness is grounded by his humanizing of madness itself. As Adrian Johnston points out in the early pages of Time Driven pre-Kantian madness meant humans were seized by demonic or angelic forces whereas Kantian madness became one of being too human. Madness becomes internalized, the external demonic forces become flaws of the individual mind. Foucault argues that, while madness is de-demonized it is also dehumanized during the Renaissance, as madmen become creatures neither diabolic nor totally human reduced to the zero degree of humanity. It is immediately clear why for Kant, speculative metaphysics must be curbed – with the problem of internal madness and without the external safeguards of transcendental conditions, there is nothing to formally separate the speculative capacities for metaphysical diagnosis from the mad ramblings of the insane mind – both equally fall outside the realm of practicality and quotidian experience. David-Menard's work is particularly useful in diagnosing the relation of thought and madness in Kant's texts. David-Menard argues that in Kant's relatively unknown “An Essay on the Maladies of the Mind” as well as his later discussion of the Seer of Swedenborg, that Kant formulates madness primarily in terms of sensory upheaval or other hallucinatory theaters. She writes: “madness is an organization of thought. It is made possible by the ambiguity of the normal relation between the imaginary and the perceived, whether this pertains to the order of sensation or to the relations between our ideas” Kant's fascination with the Seer forces Kant between the pincers of “aesthetic reconciliation” – namely melancholic withdrawal – and “a philosophical invention” – namely the critical project. Deleuze and Guattari's schizoanalysis is a combination and reversal of Kant's split, where an aesthetic over engagement with the world entails prolific conceptual invention. Their embrace of madness, however, is of course itself conceptual despite all their rhizomatic maneuvers. Though they move with the energy of madness, Deleuze and Guattari save the capacity of thought from the fangs of insanity by imbuing materiality itself with the capacity for thought. Or, as Ray Brassier puts it, “Deleuze insists, it is necessary to absolutize the immanence of this world in such a way as to dissolve the transcendent disjunction between things as we know them and as they are in themselves”. That is, whereas Kant relied on the faculty of judgment to divide representation from objectivity Deleuze attempts to flatten the whole economy beneath the juggernaut of ontological univocity. Speculation, as a particularly useful form of madness, might fall close to Deleuze and Guattari’s shaping of philosophy into a concept producing machine but is different in that it is potentially self destructive – less reliant on the stability of its own concepts and more adherent to exposing a particular horrifying swath of reality. Speculative madness is always a potential disaster in that it acknowledges little more than its own speculative power with the hope that the gibbering of at least a handful of hysterical brains will be useful. Pre-critical metaphysics amounts to madness, though this may be because the world itself is mad while new attempts at speculative metaphysics, at post-Kantian pre-critical metaphysics, are well aware of our own madness. Without the sobriety of the principle of sufficient reason we have a world of neon madness: “we would have to conceive what our life would be if all the movements of the earth, all the noises of the earth, all the smells, the tastes, all the light – of the earth and elsewhere, came to us in a moment, in an instant – like an atrocious screaming tumult of things”. Speculative thought may be participatory in the screaming tumult of the world or, worse yet, may produce its spectral double. Against theology or reason or simply commonsense, the speculative becomes heretical. Speculation, as the cognitive extension of the horrorific sublime should be met with melancholic detachment. Whereas Kant's theoretical invention, or productivity of thought, is self -sabotaging, since the advent of the critical project is a productivity of thought which then delimits the engine of thought at large either in dogmatic gestures or non-systematizable empirical wondrousness. The former is celebrated by the fiction of Thomas Ligotti whereas the latter is espoused by the tales of H.P. Lovecraft. /2/ – Weird Fiction and Philosophy. Supernatural horror, in all its eerie constructions, enables a reader to taste treats inconsistent with his personal welfare. Thomas Ligotti Songs of a Dead Dreamer. I choose weird stories because they suit my inclination best—one of my strongest and most persistent wishes being to achieve,momentarily, the illusion of some strange suspension or violation of the galling limitations of time, space, and natural law which forever imprison us and frustrate our curiosity about the infinite cosmic spaces beyond the radius of our sight and analysis H.P. Lovecraft. “Notes on Writing Weird Fiction” Lovecraft states that his creation of a story is to suspend natural law yet, at the same time, he indexes the tenuousness of such laws, suggesting the vast possibilities of the cosmic. The tension that Lovecraft sets up between his own fictions and the universe or nature is reproduced within his fictions in the common theme of the unreliable narrator; unreliable precisely because they are either mad or what they have witnessed questions the bounds of material reality. In “The Call of Cthulhu” Lovecraft writes: The most merciful thing in the world, I think, is the inability of the human mind to correlate all its contents. We live on a placid island of ignorance in the midst of black seas of infinity, and it was not meant that we should voyage far. The sciences, each straining in its own direction, have hitherto harmed us little; but some day the piecing together of dissociated knowledge will open up such terrifying vistas of reality, and of our frightful position therein, that we shall either go mad from the revelation or flee from the deadly light into the peace and safety of a new dark age. Despite Lovecraft's invocations of illusion, he is not claiming that his fantastic creations such as the Old Ones are supernatural but, following Joshi, are only ever supernormal. One can immediately see that instead of nullifying realism Lovecraft in fact opens up the real to an unbearable degree. In various letters and non-fictional statements Lovecraft espoused strictly materialist tenets, ones which he borrowed from Hugh Elliot namely the uniformity of law, the denial of teleology and the denial of non-material existence. Lovecraft seeks to explore the possibilities of such a universe by piling horror upon horror until the fragile brain which attempts to grasp it fractures. This may be why philosophy has largely ignored weird fiction – while Deleuze and Guattari mark the turn towards weird fiction and Lovecraft in particular, with the precursors to speculative realism as well as contemporary related thinkers have begun to view Lovecraft as making philosophical contributions. Lovecraft's own relation to philosophy is largely critical while celebrating Nietzsche and Schopenhauer. This relationship of Lovecraft to philosophy and philosophy to Lovecraft is coupled with Lovecraft's habit of mercilessly destroying the philosopher and the figure of the academic more generally in his work, a destruction which is both an epistemological destruction and an ontological destruction. Thomas Ligotti's weird fiction which he has designated as a kind of “confrontational escapism” might be best described in the following quote from one of his shortstories, “The human phenomenon is but the sum of densely coiled layers of illusion each of which winds itself on the supreme insanity. That there are persons of any kind when all there can be is mindless mirrors laughing and screaming as they parade about in an endless dream”. Whereas Lovecraft's weirdness draws predominantly from the abyssal depths of the uncharted universe, Ligotti's existential horror focuses on the awful proliferation of meaningless surfaces that is, the banal and every day function of representation. In an interview, Ligotti states: We don't even know what the world is like except through our sense organs, which are provably inadequate. It's no less the case with our brains. Our whole lives are motored along by forces we cannot know and perceptions that are faulty. We sometimes hear people say that they're not feeling themselves. Well, who or what do they feel like then? This is not to say that Ligotti sees nothing beneath the surface but that there is only darkness or blackness behind it, whether that surface is on the cosmological level or the personal. By addressing the implicit and explicit philosophical issues in Ligotti's work we will see that his nightmarish take on reality is a form of malevolent idealism, an idealism which is grounded in a real, albeit dark and obscure materiality. If Ligotti's horrors ultimately circle around mad perceptions which degrade the subject, it takes aim at the vast majority of the focus of continental philosophy. While Lovecraft's acidic materialism clearly assaults any romantic concept of being from the outside, Ligotti attacks consciousness from the inside: Just a little doubt slipped into the mind, a little trickle of suspicion in the bloodstream, and all those eyes of ours, one by one, open up to the world and see its horror [...] Not even the solar brilliance of a summer day will harbor you from horror. For horror eats the light and digests it into darkness. Clearly, the weird fiction of Lovecraft and Ligotti amount to a anti-anthrocentric onslaught against the ramparts of correlationist continental philosophy. /3/ – Shoggothic Materialism or the Formless Formless protoplasm able to mock and reflect all forms and organs and processes—viscous agglutinations of bubbling cells—rubbery fifteen-foot spheroids infinitely plastic and ductile—slaves of suggestion, builders of cities—more and more sullen, more and more intelligent, more and more amphibious, more and more imitative—Great God! What madness made even those blasphemous Old Ones willing to use and to carve such things? H.P. Lovecraft. “At the Mountains of Madness” On the other hand, affirming that the universe resembles nothing and is only formless amounts to saying that the universe is something like a spider or spit. Georges Bataille. “Formless”. The Shoggoths feature most prominently in H.P. Lovecraft's shortstory “At the Mountains of Madness” where they are described in the following manner: It was a terrible, indescribable thing vaster than any subway train – a shapeless congeries of protoplasmic bubbles, faintly self -luminous, and with myriads of temporary eyes forming and un-forming as pustules of greenish light all over the tunnel-filling front that bore down upon us, crushing the frantic penguins and slithering over the glistening floor that it and its kind had swept so evilly free of all litter. The term is a litmus test for materialism itself as the Shoggoth is an amorphous creature. The Shoggoths were living digging machines bio engineered by the Elder Things, and their protoplasmic bodies being formed into various tools by their hypnotic powers. The Shoggoths eventually became self aware and rose up against their masters in an ultimately failed rebellion. After the Elder Ones retreated into the oceans leaving the Shoggoths to roam the frozen wastes of the Antarctic. The onto-genesis of the Shoggoths and their gross materiality, index the horrifyingly deep time of the earth a concept near and dear to Lovecraft's formulation of horror as well as the fear of intelligences far beyond, and far before, the ascent of humankind on earth and elsewhere. The sickly amorphous nature of the Shoggoths invade materialism at large, where while materiality is unmistakably real ie not discursive, psychological, or otherwise overly subjectivist, it questions the relation of materialism to life. As Eugene Thacker writes: The Shoggoths or Elder Things do not even share the same reality with the human beings who encounter them—and yet this encounter takes place, though in a strange no-place that is neither quite that of the phenomenal world of the human subject or the noumenal world of an external reality. Amorphous yet definitively material beings are a constant in Lovecraft's tales. In his tale “The Dream-Quest of Unknown Kadatth” Lovecraft describes Azathoth as, “that shocking final peril which gibbers unmentionably outside the ordered universe,” that, “last amorphous blight of nethermost confusion which blashphemes and bubbles at the centre of all infinity,” who, “gnaws hungrily in inconceivable, unlighted chambers beyond time”. Azathoth's name may have multiple origins but the most striking is the alchemy term azoth which is both a cohesive agent and a acidic creation pointing back to the generative and the decayed. The indistinction of generation and degradation materially mirrors the blur between the natural and the unnatural as well as life and non-life. Lovecraft speaks of the tension between the natural and the unnatural is his short story “The Unnameable.” He writes, “if the psychic emanations of human creatures be grotesque distortions, what coherent representation could express or portray so gibbous and infamous a nebulousity as the spectre of a malign, chaotic perversion, itself a morbid blasphemy against Nature?”. Lovecraft explores exactly the tension outlined at the beginning of this chapter, between life and thought. At the end of his short tale Lovecraft compounds the problem as the unnameable is described as “a gelatin—a slime—yet it had shapes, a thousand shapes of horror beyond all memory”. Deleuze suggests that becoming-animal is operative throughout Lovecraft's work, where narrators feel themselves reeling at their becoming non-human or of being the anomalous or of becoming atomized. Following Eugene Thacker however, it may be far more accurate to say that Lovecraft's tales exhibit not a becoming-animal but a becoming-creature. Where the monstrous breaks the purportedly fixed laws of nature, the creature is far more ontologically ambiguous. The nameless thing is an altogether different horizon for thought. The creature is either less than animal or more than animal – its becoming is too strange for animal categories and indexes the slow march of thought towards the bizarre. This strangeness is, as aways, some indefinite swirling in the category of immanence and becoming. Bataille begins “The Labyrinth” with the assertion that being, to continue to be, is becoming. More becoming means more being hence the assertion that Bataille's barking dog is more than the sponge. This would mean that the Shoggotth is altogether too much being, too much material in the materialism. Bataille suggests that there is an immanence between the eater and the eaten, across the species and never within them. That is, despite the chaotic storm of immanence there must remain some capacity to distinguish the gradients of becoming without reliance upon, or at least total dependence upon, the powers of intellection to parse the universe into recognizable bits, properly digestible factoids. That is, if we undo Deleuze's aforementioned valorization of sense which, for his variation of materialism, performed the work of the transcendental, but refuse to reinstate Kant's transcendental disjunction between thing and appearance, then it must be a quality of becoming-as-being itself which can account for the discernible nature of things by sense. In an interview with Peter Gratton, Jane Bennett formulates the problem thusly: What is this strange systematicity proper to a world of Becoming? What, for example, initiates this congealing that will undo itself? Is it possible to identify phases within this formativity, plateaus of differentiation? If so, do the phases/plateaus follow a temporal sequence? Or, does the process of formation inside Becoming require us to theorize a non-chronological kind of time? I think that your student’s question: “How can we account for something like iterable structures in an assemblage theory?” is exactly the right question. Philosophy has erred too far on the side of the subject in the subject-object relation and has furthermore, lost the very weirdness of the non-human. Beyond this, the madness of thought need not override. /4/ - Ventriloquial Idealism or the Externality of Thought My aim is the opposite of Lovecraft's. He had an appreciation for natural scenery on earth and wanted to reach beyond the visible in the universe. I have no appreciation for natural scenery and want the objective universe to be a reflection of a character. Thomas Ligotti. “Devotees of Decay and Desolation.” Unless life is a dream, nothing makes sense. For as a reality, it is a rank failure [….] Horror is more real than we are. Thomas Ligotti. “Professor Nobody's Little Lectures on Supernatural Horror”. Thomas Ligotti's tales are rife with mannequins, puppets, and other brainless entities which of replace the valorized subject of philosophy – that of the free thinking human being. His tales such as “The Dream of the Manikin” aim to destroy the rootedness of consciousness. James Trafford has connected the anti-egoism of Ligotti to Thomas Metzinger – where the self is at best an illusion and we plead desperately for someone else to acknowledge that we are real. Trafford has stated it thus, “Life is played out as an inescapable puppet show, an endless dream in which the puppets are generally unaware that they are trapped within a mesmeric dance of whose mechanisms they know nothing and over which they have no control”. An absolute materialism, for Ligotti, implies an alienation of the idea which leads to a ventriloquil idealism. As Ligotti notes in an interview, “the fiasco and nightmare of existence, the particular fiasco and nightmare of human existence, the sense that people are puppets of powers they cannot comprehend, etc.” And then further elaborates that,“[a]ssuming that anything has to exist, my perfect world would be one in which everyone has experienced the annulment of his or her ego. That is, our consciousness of ourselves as unique individuals would entirely disappear”. The externality of the idea leads to the unfortunate consequence of consciousness eating at itself through horror which, for Ligotti, is more real than reality and goes beyond horror-as-affect. Beyond this, taking together with the unreality of life and the ventriloquizing of subjectivity, Ligotti's thought becomes an idealism in which thought itself is alien and ultimately horrifying. The role of human thought and the relation of non-relation of horror to thought is not completely clear in Ligotti's The Conspiracy Against the Human Race. Ligotti argues in his The Conspiracy Against the Human Race,that the advent of thought is a mistake of nature and that horror is being in the sense that horror results from knowing too much. Yet, at the same time, Ligotti seems to suggest that thought separates us from nature whereas, for Lovecraft, thought is far less privileged – mind is just another manifestation of the vital principal, it is just another materialization of energy. In his brilliant “Prospects for Post-Copernican Dogmatism” Iain Grant rallies against the negative definition of dogmatism and the transcendental, and suggests that negatively defining both over-focuses on conditions of access and subjectivism at the expense of the real or nature. With Schelling, who is Grant's champion against the subjectivist bastions of both Fichte and Kant, Ligotti's idealism could be taken as a transcendental realism following from an ontological realism. Yet the transcendental status of Ligotti's thought move towards a treatment of the transcendental which may threaten to leave beyond its realist ground. Ligotti states: Belief in the supernatural is only superstition. That said, a sense of the supernatural, as Conrad evidenced in Heart of Darkness, must be admitted if one's inclination is to go to the limits of horror. It is the sense of what should not be- the sense of being ravaged by the impossible. Phenomenally speaking, the super-natural may be regarded as the metaphysical counterpart of insanity, a transcendental correlative of a mind that has been driven mad. Again, Ligotti equates madness with thought, qualifying both as supernatural while remaining less emphatic about the metaphysical dimensions of horror. The question becomes one of how exactly the hallucinatory realm of the ideal relates to the black churning matter of Lovecraft's chaos of elementary particles. In his tale “I Have a Special Plan for This World” Ligotti formulates thus: A: There is no grand scheme of things. B: If there were a grand scheme of things, the fact – the fact – that we are not equipped to perceive it, either by natural or supernatural means, is a nightmarish obscenity. C: The very notion of a grand scheme of things is a nightmarish obscenity. Here Ligotti is not discounting metaphysics but implying that if it does exist the fact that we are phenomenologically ill-equipped to perceive that it is nightmarish. For Ligotti, nightmare and horror occur within the circuit of consciousness whereas for Lovecraft the relation between reality and mind is less productive on the side of mind. It is easier to ascertain how the Kantian philosophy is a defense against the diseases of the head as Kant armors his critical enterprise from too much of the world and too much of the mind. The weird fiction of both Lovecraft and Ligotti demonstrates that there is too much of both feeding into one another in a way that corrodes the Kantian schema throughly, breaking it down into a dead but still ontologically potentiated nigredo. The haunting, terrifying fact of Ligotti's idealism is that the transcendental motion which brought thought to matter, while throughly material and naturalized, brings with it the horror that thought cannot be undone without ending the material that bears it either locally or completely. Thought comes from an elsewhere and an elsewhen being-in-thought. The unthinkable outside thought is as maddening as the unthought engine of thought itself within thought which doesn't exist except for the mind, the rotting décor of the brain. /5/ - Hyperstitional Transcendental Paranoia or Self -Expelled Thought Weird fiction has been given some direct treatment in philosophy in the mad black Deleuzianism of Nick Land. Nick Land along with others in the 1990s created the Cyber Culture Research Unit as well as the research group Hyperstition. The now defunct hyperstitional website, an outgrowth of the Cyber Culture Research Unit, defined hyperstition in the following fourfold: 1-Element of effective culture that makes itself real. 2-Fictional quantity functional as a time-traveling device. 3-Coincidence intensifier. 4-Call to the Old Ones. The distinctively Lovecraftian character of hyperstition is hard to miss as is its Deleuzo-Guattarian roots. In the opening pages of A Thousand Plateaus Deleuze and Guattari write, “We have been criticized for over-quoting literary authors. But when one writes, the only question is which other machine the literary machine can be plugged into”. The indisinction of literature and philosophy mirrors the mess of being and knowing as post-correlationist philosophy, where philosophy tries to make itself real where literature, especially the weird, aims itself at the brain-circuit of horror. The texts of both Lovecraft and Ligotti work through horror as epistemological plasticity meeting with proximity as well as the deep time of Lovecraft and the glacially slow time of paranoia in Ligotti. Against Deleuze, and following Brassier, we cannot allow the time of consciousness, the Bergsonian time of the duree, to override natural time, but instead acknowledge that it is an unfortunate fact of existence as a thinking being. Horror-time, the time of consciousness, with all its punctuated moments and drawn out terrors, cannot compare to the deep time of non-existence both in the unreachable past and the unknown future. The crystalline cogs of Kant's account of experience as the leading light for the possibility of metaphysics must be throughly obliterated. His gloss of experience in Prolegomena to any Future Metaphysics could not be more sterile: Experience consists of intuitions, which belong to the sensibility, and of judgments, which are entirely a work of the understanding. But the judgments which the understanding makes entirely out of sensuous intuitions are far from being judgments of experience. For in the one case the judgment connects only the perceptions as they are given in sensuous intuition [....] Experience consists in the synthetic connection of appearances in consciousness, so far as this connection is necessary. Here it is difficult to dismiss the queasiness that Kant's legalism induces upon sight for both Badiou and David-Menard. Kant's thought becomes, as Foucault says when reflecting on Sade's text in relation to nature, “the savage abolition of itself”. For Badiou, Kant's philosophy simply closes off too much of the outside, freezing the world of thought in an all too limited formalism. Critical philosophy is simply the systematized quarantine on future thinking, on thinking which would threaten the formalism which artificially grants thought its own coherency in the face of madness. Even the becoming-mad of Deleuze, while escaping the rumbling ground, makes grounds for itself, mad grounds but grounds which are thinkable in their affect. The field of effects allows for Deleuze's aesthetic and radical empiricism, in which effects and/or occasions make up the material of the world to be thought as a chaosmosis of simulacra. Given a critique of an empiricism of aesthetics, of the image, it may be difficult to justify an attack on Kantian formalism with the madness of literature, which does not aim to make itself real but which we may attempt to make real. That is, how do Lovecraft's and Ligotti's materials, as materials for philosophy to work on, differ from either the operative formalisms of Kant or the implicitly formalized images of Deleuzian empiricism? It is simply that such texts do not aim to make themselves real, and make claims to the real which are more alien to us than familiar, which is why their horror is immediately more trustworthy. This is the madness which Blanchot discusses in The Infinite Conversation through Cervantes and his knight – the madness of book-life, of the perverse unity of literature and life a discussion which culminates in the discussion of one of the weird's masters, that of Kafka. The text is the knowing of madness, since madness, in its moment of becoming-more-mad, cannot be frozen in place but by the solidifications of externalizing production. This is why Foucault ends his famous study with works of art. Furthermore extilligence, the ability to export the products of our maligned brains, is the companion of the attempts to export, or discover the possibility of intelligences outside of our heads, in order for philosophy to survive the solar catastrophe. To borrow again from Deleuze, writing is inseparable from becoming. The mistake is to believe that madness is reabsorbed by extilligence, by great works, or that it could be exorcised by the expelling of thought into the inorganic or differently organic. Going out of our heads does not guarantee we will no longer mean we cannot still go out of our minds. This is simply because of the outside, of matter, or force, or energy, or thing-in-itself, or Schopenhauerian Will. In Lovecraft’s “The Music of Erich Zahn” an “impoverished student of metaphysics” becomes intrigued by strange viol music coming from above his room. After meeting the musician the student discovers that each night he plays frantic music at a window in order to keep some horridness at bay, some “impenetrable darkness with chaos and pandemonium”. The aesthetic defenses provided by the well trained brain can bear the hex of matter for so long, the specter of unalterability within it which too many minds obliterate, collapsing everything before the thought of thought as thinkable or at least noetically mutable on our own terms. Transcendental paranoia is the concurrent nightmare and promise of Paul Humphrey's work, of being literally out of our minds. It is the gothic counterpart of thinking non-conceptually but also of thinking never belonging to any instance of purportedly solid being. As Bataille stated, “At the boundary of that which escapes cohesion, he who reflects within cohesion realizes there is no longer any room for him” Thought is immaterial only to the degree that it is inhuman, it is a power that tries, always with failure, to ascertain its own genesis. Philosophy, if it can truly return to the great outdoors, if it can leave behind the dead loop of the human skull, must recognize not only the non-priority of human thought, but that thought never belongs to the brain that thinks it, thought comes from somewhere else. To return to the train image from the beginning “a locomotive rolling on the surface of the earth is the image of continuous metamorphosis” this is the problem of thought, and of thinking thought, of being no longer able to isolate thought, with only a thought-formed structure. [1] One of the central tenets of Francois Laruelle's non-philosophy is that philosophy has traditionally operated on material already presupposed as thinkable instead of trying to think the real in itself. Philosophy, according to Laruelle, remains fixated on transcendental synthesis which shatters immanence into an empirical datum and an a prori factum which are then fused by a third thing such as the ego. For a critical account of Laruelle's non-philosophy see Ray Brassier's Nihil Unbound. (shrink)

According to a common misconception, Kant rejects rhetoric as worthy of no respect and neglects popularity as a dispensable accessory. Two recent publications on the communicative dimension of Kant’s conception and practice of philosophy represent a very solid rebuttal of such criticism. The books in question are Kant’s Philosophy of Communication by G. L. Ercolini and A linguagem em Kant. A linguagem de Kant edited by Monique Hulshof and Ubirajara Rancan de Azevedo Marques, especially in light of the long (...) chapter “Kant e a Questão da Popularidade e da Linguagem da Filosofia” by Leonel Ribeiro dos Santos (pp. 17- 69). What Ercolini’s monograph and Santos’ chapter have in common, is that they both argue that Kant does indeed value and practice both rhetoric and popularity. However, they differ from each other in that Ercolini lets Kant’s reflection on popularity derive from occasional factors, while Santos locates its origin at the heart of Kant’s critical project. In order fully to appreciate their novelty, these two contributions call for an overview of the state of research on the subject of Kant’s conception of rhetoric. Thus, before closely examining them, I will briefly outline the relevant scholarship by dividing it into the three classes of those who interpret Kant (a) as a skillful rhetorician, (b) as dismissive of rhetoric, and finally (c) as according rhetoric a moral function. (shrink)

Is the United States "the land of equal opportunity" or is the playing field tilted in favor of those whose parents are wealthy, well educated, and white? If family background is important in getting ahead, why? And if the processes that transmit economic status from parent to child are unfair, could public policy address the problem? Unequal Chances provides new answers to these questions by leading economists, sociologists, biologists, behavioral geneticists, and philosophers.New estimates show that intergenerational inequality in the United (...) States is far greater than was previously thought. Moreover, while the inheritance of wealth and the better schooling typically enjoyed by the children of the well-to-do contribute to this process, these two standard explanations fail to explain the extent of intergenerational status transmission. The genetic inheritance of IQ is even less important. Instead, parent-offspring similarities in personality and behavior may play an important role. Race contributes to the process, and the intergenerational mobility patterns of African Americans and European Americans differ substantially.Following the editors' introduction are chapters by Greg Duncan, Ariel Kalil, Susan E. Mayer, Robin Tepper, and Monique R. Payne; Bhashkar Mazumder; David J. Harding, Christopher Jencks, Leonard M. Lopoo, and Susan E. Mayer; Anders Björklund, Markus Jäntti, and Gary Solon; Tom Hertz; John C. Loehlin; Melissa Osborne Groves; Marcus W. Feldman, Shuzhuo Li, Nan Li, Shripad Tuljapurkar, and Xiaoyi Jin; and Adam Swift. (shrink)